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Abstract
The presence of peacekeepers, whether they are mandated by the international
community or used internally by a sovereign nation, has a limited effect on the ability to achieve
a lasting peace and may even function as an obstacle, as seen through a comparative study of the
conflicts in Kashmir and Northern Ireland. Because of this, they are of limited utility as the final
step towards a society that has reconciled with its past conflict due to the fact that the
peacekeepers (efforts work towards short-term peace) do not act as peacebuilders (efforts work
towards long-term peace). The regions of Kashmir and Northern Ireland will be analyzed in
detail in reference to the notion that peacekeeping is ineffective because, although the manner in
which they were handled was completely different, they have still yet to reach the post-conflict
society status. Kashmir was sent United Nations (UN) peacekeepers while Northern Ireland was
sent British troops to serve as peacekeepers. Neither of these case studies were extreme in how
peacekeeping was ineffective (such as Rwanda), yet they demonstrate the lack of success within
the approach.

Brennan
Table of Contents
I.  
II.  

Introduction

4

Methodology and Limitations

7

a.   Methodology

7

b.   Limitations

8

III.  

Theoretical Framework

8

IV.  

Literature Review

10

V.  

VI.  

VII.  
VIII.  
IX.  

a.   How Peacekeeping is Effective

10

b.   How Peacekeeping is Ineffective

13

c.   Contributions to Existing Scholarship

16

Case Study: Kashmir

17

a.   Historical Overview of the Conflict

17

b.   Kashmir in the 21st Century

20

Case Study: Northern Ireland

22

a.   Historical Overview of the Conflict

22

b.   Northern Ireland in the 21st Century

25

Analysis

27

Conclusion

34

Works Cited

36

3

Brennan

4

Introduction
For a handful of conflicts around the world, the international community’s solution is the
deployment of United Nations’ (UN) peacekeeping officers to transition the region from its
current state of violence to negotiation and ultimately, to a post-conflict society. Peacekeeping
forces can also be supplied by the state in which the conflict is occurring in order to accomplish
the same tasks. It is important to note that the use of the term ‘peacekeeping’ in this thesis does
not align directly with the definition of peacekeepers supplied by the UN. Rather, the term
‘peacekeeping’ will be used in reference to the definition of Johan Galtung, who states that
peacekeeping is a “balance of power” and that, “the antagonists are kept away from each other
under mutual threats of considerable punishment if they transgress, particularly if they transgress
into each other’s territory” (Galtung 282). Additionally, it is important to keep in mind the way
peacekeeping is described by the UN: “UN Peacekeepers provide security and the political and
peacebuilding support to help countries make the difficult, early transition from conflict to
peace” (“United Nations Peacekeeping”) as it differs from the definition I will be using from
Galtung.
Peacekeeping will be viewed in the international sense by analyzing continued UN
peacekeeper presence along the Line of Control between Indian-controlled Kashmir and
Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, and it will also be viewed in the domestic sense by analyzing
Operation Banner, or the presence of British Troops in Northern Ireland during the Troubles and
post-Good Friday Agreement. The peacekeeping efforts in Kashmir and Norther Ireland have
done little to move the regions past the transitional stage. I contend that both conflicts keep
Kashmir and Northern Ireland from transitioning to a post-conflict society. The status of
peacekeeping efforts in Kashmir and Northern Ireland suggests that peacekeepers – whether they
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are international or state in nature – are limited in their ability to bring about a post-conflict state
as they struggle to solve the societal and structural aspects of the conflict. Because of this, their
actions only achieve a portion of the final step towards a society that has reconciled with its past
conflict due to the fact that the peacekeepers do not act as peacebuilders.
For the section entitled “Literature Review,” academic writings that discuss peacekeeping
versus peacebuilding and the effectiveness of peacekeeping debate whether peacekeeping forces
are successful in their missions. There was a number of scholars who argued that peacekeeping,
though not without its flaws, is effective and another group who argued that peacekeeping is
ineffective as it either does little to reach a post-conflict society and remains in the transitional
stage or even that peacekeeping makes the situation worse rather than better. While each
academic piece has their own way of measuring success (some measure it by the end of violent
conflict while others measure it by the transition into a post-conflict society), the groups were
separated by their thoughts on the effectiveness of peacekeeping, not by their standards of
success for a peacekeeping mission. The two sides have been split, as it is important for those
reading this thesis to see that the opinion expressed by myself is not exactly what the majority
believe.
Galtung’s theories of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding along with negative
peace versus positive peace will be explored through the context of the peacekeeping missions in
Kashmir and Northern Ireland in the “Theoretical Framework” section. Additionally, Galtung’s
definition of peacekeeping will be compared to the UN’s definition of peacekeeping. Throughout
the paper, the idea of what the UN considers to be peacekeeping and what Galtung considers to
be peacekeeping will be analyzed.
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A closer look at the histories of the Kashmir and Northern Ireland and the current
situations of the case studies will be explored in the “Case Studies” section. When looking at
Kashmir’s history, the portion will mainly be focusing on the conflict starting with the partition
in 1949 and finishing with the push for peace in the 1990s. It will highlight the main events that
are most famous from the long-term conflict with the reminder that peacekeepers were present
since the partition. This will lead into the case study section on Kashmir, which discusses peace
efforts that have been made in the 2000s as well as the collapse of this renewed hope in peace.
This is the result of a high number of ceasefire violations along the Line of Control, even with
peacekeepers present. In Northern Ireland’s “Historical Overview,” there is a brief detailing of
the creation of Northern Ireland and an overview of the period called the Troubles, which was an
intense period of conflict in the region that spanned 30 years (1968-1998). The case study
portion will look at the end of the peacekeeping mission in Northern Ireland and analyze whether
it can be viewed as a post-conflict society based off of a number of current situations in Northern
Ireland (the peace walls, Brexit) that question the success of Operation Banner (deployment of
British troops).
Based on the information presented above, the “improvements” caused by the
peacekeepers in the regions of the case studies are short-term because the most that peacekeepers
can do is achieve short-term peace. The way that Kashmiri and Northern Irish society functions
demonstrates that they have not moved away from the conflict. There are continuous violations
of the ceasefire on the border of Pakistani and Indian Kashmir and Northern Ireland still has
active paramilitary groups on both sides that keep the conflict alive through fear and intimidation
tactics.
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Methodology and Limitations
Methodology
For the historical overview and case studies sections, I was able to use a number of
books, peace documents such as the Good Friday Agreement and the Lahore Declaration, and
government/UN online resources in order to give a rounded view of Kashmir and Northern
Ireland. I utilized academic journals and writings for the rest of my research as the topic of the
effectiveness of peacekeeping is highly debated. Many of the academic journals that I have
found that debate the effectiveness/ineffectiveness of peacekeeping focus on other case studies
such as Kosovo, Bosnia, and Sierra Leone. I felt that this adds to my thesis because it
demonstrates that I am contributing a different view on the scholarly conversation of this topic
by using two regions that are not typically used when examining the effectiveness of
peacekeeping. Additionally, it serves as further evidence to my claim that peacekeeping is
ineffective as I provide a number of other sources that list the method of peacekeeping as
ineffective in their case studies. The academic journals that I utilize as a counterpoint to my
thesis acknowledge that the main form of peace that peacekeeping achieves is short-term, but
they assert that this type of peace is necessary as other types of long-term peace can build off of
it. My other articles that agree with my statement also note the short-term (occasional) successes
of peacekeeping, but highlight how this is a problem as it only does part of what is required for a
full solution.
Opinions surrounding the effectiveness of peacekeepers and the state of the conflicts in
Kashmir and Northern Ireland are not unanimous; there is disagreement within the academic
community on these topics. Therefore, much of the research relied on academic journals
debating these topics, the historical background of the two conflicts and how peacekeeping
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affected the conflicts (whether it was ineffective, or even negative). Additionally, peace
documents such as The Good Friday Agreement1 and the Lahore Declaration2. were important to
the methodology. Analyzing the linguistics of these documents helps gain a greater look at what
peacekeepers felt constitutes as ‘keeping the peace’.

Limitations
Some limitations that I encountered during the writing process were that because the
conflicts in Kashmir and Northern Ireland are not considered to be ‘contemporary’, it was
difficult to find recent articles and documents pertaining to the states of the conflicts. There were
many important articles about the topics written before 20113. I have decided to incorporate them
into my “Case Study” portion. Additionally, the situation in either of the case studies could
change at any point during or after this thesis was written. The finalized Brexit plan could have
serious and consequential outcomes for the continuation of a fragile peace in Northern Ireland.

Theoretical Framework
One of the main theories that will be used throughout the entirety of the paper is Johan
Galtung’s “Three Approaches to Peace: Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding”. He
gives three separate definitions that detail what stage of the conflict each is used at and what they
are able to accomplish if implemented correctly. Peacemaking is the initial call to stop the
violence; it is a short-term form of peace. Peacekeeping is the transitional period where violence
has stopped and negotiations are in the works – the purpose is to maintain the negative peace
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while a more formal set of rules can instruct people how to successfully transition from a state of
conflict to a state of peace; it is a short-term form of peace. Lastly, peacebuilding is a renewal
process where the root causes of the violent conflict are evaluated and (hopefully) eradicated
from the society. This portion is very difficult as it requires a transformation of thought and
strongly held beliefs that pertain to the local society in order to achieve long-term peace.
Conversely, the UN definition of peacekeepers varies from what Galtung wrote, as it
appears that the UN peacekeeping definition is a combination of peacemaking, peacekeeping,
and peacebuilding. The UN claims that peacekeepers “…provide security and the political and
peacebuilding support to help countries make the difficult, early transition from conflict to
peace” (“United Nations Peacekeeping”). For the UN, their use of peacebuilding differs from
Galtung’s as he writes about the longevity of the peacebuilding process, yet the UN includes the
phrase “peacebuilding” with “early transition from conflict to peace”. The Charter of the United
Nations explains the different uses for peacekeepers, depending on the mission. Chapter VI
focuses on negotiating peace during conflict and how the peacekeeping forces can aid in that,
while Chapter VII outlines the process of approval for use of physical action on the part of the
peacekeepers. The Charter gives a more detailed view into the responsibilities of UN
peacekeeping forces, showing how they are far more focused on acquiring negative peace for the
sake of continuing the peace process (“Charter of the United Nations”). However, the language
used in the UN’s description of the role of peacekeepers, specifically the word “peacebuilding”
and “early transition,” makes the purpose of their presence confusing in places like Kashmir,
where the mission has been in place for decades. For Galtung, the early transition period better
aligns with peacemaking and peacekeeping, rather than peacebuilding.
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The terms “negative peace” and “positive peace,” another set of phrases coined by
Galtung, are frequently used and important to the main thesis. Negative peace is a period where
violence has ended, but the conflict itself is still ongoing in a political sense. Positive peace is the
peace that is the ultimate goal of something like peacebuilding; it is a complete resolution of the
issue at hand. In the thesis, the idea of negative peace will be associated with the outcomes of
successful peacemaking and peacekeeping, while positive peace will be viewed as an outcome of
successful peacebuilding.

Literature Review
How Peacekeeping is Effective
Many within the academic community regard peacekeeping missions as success and
effective in resolving conflicts. Han Dorussen describes how different approaches to
peacekeeping can vary the effectiveness of the peacekeeping process. Looking at the case study
of Timor Leste, Dorussen suggests that the bottom-up or local peacekeeping approach is one that
produces results. In this sense, the author is arguing that the presence of peacekeepers does
control the outcome of a region emerging from a conflict. Although the author recognizes that
Timor Leste has not been without issue, the overall consensus is that the UN peacekeeping
mission was a success as they have been relatively stable since 2012.
It is interesting that this argument does believe in the work of peacekeepers as a sizable
amount of the text is aimed at criticizing the current approach to most peacekeeping missions,
citing Liberia as an example. However, the author does concede to the notion that, although
peacekeeping has not always been locally focused, it has had local impacts. He starts by saying,
“…a modest deployment of peacekeepers shortens the duration of conflict episodes in a
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particular locality,” (Dorussen 4) and continues with the statement that the presence of
peacekeepers, “…makes attacks against civilians by armed factions less likely…‘Blue Helmets’
provide a basic level of security in situations where insecurity is the norm rather than the
exception” (Dorussen 4). These statements solidify his belief that the presence of peacekeeping
does create some sort of effect on the conflict. On whether or not this effect does more than
create a negative peace, the author writes, “The need for peacebuilding, rather than
peacekeeping…seems evident, and the value of local peacekeeping may well be that it
recognizes the importance of harnessing the local capacity to build peace” (Dorussen 4). Here, he
argues that the type of localized peacekeeping he is advocating for could continue past the
peacekeeping process into peacebuilding, creating a more long-term, positive peace.
Like Dorussen, Gözde Kaya calls for a change in the way peacekeeping is carried out in
her article. Unlike Dorussen, however, she argues that this change is not necessarily a localized
one, but rather that it combines the action of peacekeeping and peacemaking. She states, “…the
UN peacekeeping and observer forces go further than trying to keep the parties apart or
monitoring a ceasefire,” (Kaya 47). Kaya later writes:
“…the objectives of the new peacekeeping include conflict prevention, guarantee
and denial of movement, protection and upholding of human rights, delivery of
humanitarian relief under fire, supervision of a comprehensive peace settlement,
running elections and overseeing land reform, military assistance to civil
structures in a failed state and rebuilding failed states” (Kaya 51)
This is different than Dorussen’s idea that for peacekeeping to be successful, local approaches
must be taken. Nonetheless, Kaya upholds the notion that while the “old” peacekeeping was
more thought of as maintaining a negative peace, the “new” peacekeeping is more of an active
force in building up institutions and initiatives that encourage and create peace after a settlement
has been reached in the conflict.
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Both Dorussen’s and Kaya’s arguments are necessary to look at in the context of the
main thesis as they, like many other arguments, only focus on what can create a short-term
peace. Even the reorganizing of state and local institutions will have no effect if the root of the
problem is not properly addressed by the state and the outside forces that are facilitating the
peace process. Dorussen believes that peacekeepers can take on this peacebuilding role, but for it
to be successful would take a major reworking of the way peacekeepers are trained, specifically
at the UN. Additionally, it would be a long process as changing the societal outlook about the
roots of the conflicts which are ingrained in the members of the community involves a lot of
“undoing” on the part of the peacebuilders. While these arguments provide challenges to the
proposed thesis, they do not adequately address the problems of undoing the root causes of
conflict and creating an environment for the growth of long-term peace.
Authors Hultman, Kathman and Shannon write in support of the idea that peacekeepers
can affect the outcomes of conflicts, yet they recognize that this may not lead to long-term peace,
stating, “Our findings show that peace operations produce a positive short-term effect of
reducing hostilities between belligerents. Yet, a question remains with regard to whether this is
necessarily a desired outcome from a policy perspective.” (Hultman, Kathman, Shannon 751).
They are briefly conceding to the notion that short-term peace is rarely true peace, as the roots of
the original conflicts always lurk beneath the surface. These authors may not base the success of
peacekeeping missions on the long-term effects, but for the way in which I measure success in
peacekeeping, positive long-term effects are the only way to ensure a concrete resolution.
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How Peacekeeping is Ineffective
Todd Sandler uses three separate studies to support the notion that the presence of
peacekeepers either does nothing in terms of advancing the peace process for a conflict or
worsens the conflict. He cites Patrick Regan’s study that found the following evidence:
“… third-party interventions extend the length of intrastate war, unless the
intervention is biased to one of the adversaries. Neutral interventions, orchestrated
by international organizations, tend to prolong this conflict” (Sandler 1890).
The first study that he looks at was done by Diehl, Reifschneider, and Hensel in 1996, which
looked at 147 interstate crises that had UN interventions. Their standard of effectiveness, or what
they judged as a successful intervention, required “no militarized conflict within ten years of the
UN intervention” (Sandler 1890). Their results produced their belief that “UN intervention of
any kind was no better than no intervention in heading off a militarized interstate crisis” (Sandler
1890). While Sandler attributes this conclusion to their standard of effectiveness, it is telling that
out of 147 crises over a period of 42 years, they concluded that the presence of peacekeepers or
the lack of presence of peacekeepers had no effect on the overall conflict.
Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild completed a similar study in 2001, but their standard of
effectiveness was that the region remained at peace for five years. While a study like this would
support the idea that peacekeeping is effective, it ignores the possibility of a return to conflict in
the subsequent years. The third study, done by Doyle and Sambanis and analyzed by Sandler,
looks at the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping in areas two to five years after the intervention
there began, judging the success of it on a lenient and strict scale. The result of this study was
that short-term peace was better maintained if the intervention began after the drafting of a peace
treaty. Based off of these three studies, the most in-depth study (Diehl, Reifschneider, and
Hensel) produced results that align with my thesis. The second and third studies still support the
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idea that peacekeepers do make a change in conflict zones, but they acknowledge that these
successes are short-term. However, it is important to note that UN peacekeeping forces are
restricted by the UN’s mandates, which determines how they can respond to their given conflict.
Similarly, author Marício Vieira uses the case study of Sierra Leone to illustrate how the
peacekeeping mission there failed to create a long-term peace. Vieira comes to the conclusion
that if peacekeepers do evoke change in a particular region, the peace that is there is a negative
peace; the violence may have stopped, but that doesn’t mean that the conflict in other spheres of
society has ended. He claims that the creation of negative peace “…pose[s] unaccountable
challenges in providing peace before, during, and after an armed conflict” (Vieira 90). This
means that negative peace is not a step forward but a step backward; it creates more problems
than it solves. Although he uses a different approach to analyzing the effectiveness of
peacekeeping than Sandler, Vieira comes to the same conclusion that either its goals are not
successful or its intentions are channeled into the wrong focuses of peacekeeping.
While other articles in support of peacekeeping call for a more localized approach, author
Stefano Costalli writes in his article, “Bosnia shows that peacekeeping missions in civil conflicts
can often have little impact on the level of violence.” He continues by discussing how
institutions like the UN fail to adequately organize and localize their missions. They have
relatively no impact on the creation of a negative or positive peace in the chosen case study,
Bosnia. The author discusses the ineffectiveness of the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia by
claiming that, because of the nature of the conflict (civil war), peacekeepers are not properly
equipped because it is a local conflict and what drew the troops to the region originally has
probably evolved into something else since their arrival. He explains how examining a conflict at
the local level could offer more in-depth explanations of the roots of the conflict. However,
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Costalli notes that it is not common to utilize micro-level information in peacekeeping missions
(1).
This argument can be used for both Kashmir and Northern Ireland, as their conflicts are
local and very particular to the histories of the regions. Northern Ireland was treated as a
domestic case while Kashmir was treated and is continually treated as a peacekeeping mission.
The lack of understanding of the ever-changing conflict could have an impact on their
ineffectiveness. The author points out other issues with peacekeeping missions, claiming they
don’t know how to handle particular conflicts when they arrive. He states, “In addition,
peacekeeping missions are often undermined by problems such as unclear mandates; fragmented
command chains leading to contrasts and delays, and incapacity to develop a wide strategic plan”
(1). This article suggests that not only is the notion of peacekeeping not enough to achieve a
successful, long-term peace, but that the ways in which these missions were unorganized which
led to confusion and inaction on the part of the troops.
Peacekeepers, whether state or international, have other interests that may alter the way
that they approach their involvement in the mission. As author Maja Garb states in her article,
most peacekeeping missions are at least expected to put an end to armed conflict. However, she
claims that “…peacekeepers are often influenced by narrower national interests of contributing
countries and…a fear of casualties among the peacekeepers” (Garb 59). This could mean that
peacekeepers are unwilling to get involved because they fear they will lose troops to a conflict
that they have no real interest in, or that they are only willing to get involved to protect particular
interests that they have in the conflict. Either way, this behavior on the part of the home country
of the peacekeepers prevents the forces from completing the bare minimum requirement of
negative peace.
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Contributions to Existing Scholarship
The proposed thesis will bring a new component to the conversation of effectiveness of
peacekeeping because this paper will use a UN peacekeeping case study and a state
peacekeeping case study. Many current conversations about the effectiveness of case studies
only focus on the UN missions, which is why a number of the supplementary sources deal with
UN intervention cases. Through an analysis of the continued peacekeeping mission in Kashmir
and the seemingly finished peacekeeping operation in Northern Ireland, the information
presented by the comparative study produces the notion that the presence of peacekeepers does
not make lasting efforts towards a resolution, as both are ongoing. Although the nature of the
case studies is different4, it is imperative that both state and UN peacekeeping examples are used
as they demonstrate that one does not work better than the other. They both have similar
approaches to what they consider “peace,” which is what this thesis argues is their flaw. While
one of Sandler’s studies discusses the idea that the resolution of a conflict is not contingent on
the presence of peacekeepers, their “case studies” were all based on UN missions.
Additionally, if the peacekeepers can be attributed to creating something, it would be the
presence of a short-term peace, which cannot be considered a success because a lasting peace
involves mediating the root of the conflict in the community, not a ceasefire. The given thesis
shares this idea with a number of authors, many which support the idea that a short-term peace
should not be the criterion for success for peacekeepers, yet many still believe in considering it
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to be somewhat effective because of this, which is where the thesis diverges from the typical
argument.

Case Study: Kashmir
Historical Overview of the Conflict

Map of Kashmir and the “Line of Control” (dotted).

The beginning of the “Kashmir Problem” can be attributed to the independence of India and
Pakistan from the British Empire in 1947. With newfound independence, a partition was
conceived on the basis of religious majorities in certain regions. What is now known as India
was the Hindu majority and what is now known as Pakistan was the Muslim majority. However,
the lines were blurred in the state of Kashmir. The British-installed ruler of the region, Maharaja
Hari Singh, believed that if he withheld from making a decision quickly, he could maintain a
state of independence in Kashmir. This proved to be ineffective because riots and protests,
mainly on the part of Muslim and Pakistani citizens, created an uncertain atmosphere which
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ultimately pushed the Maharaja to accede to India. As per the accession agreement, the Kashmiri
state would remain relatively autonomous except for responsibilities relating to defense,
communication and foreign affairs, which would be controlled by India. Indian forces entered
the region of Kashmir to enforce the accession while Pakistani forces entered the region as they
felt that the state belonged to Pakistan (Blahnik). This caused the first Indo-Pakistani War which
began in October 1947, when the Maharaja acceded to India and the Pakistani citizens invaded
and ended in January 1, 1949, when the UN organized a ceasefire. The ceasefire line, or the Line
of Control, has remained the imposed internal border of the two territories: Pakistan controls the
northern and western parts of the state while India controls Jammu, Ladakh and the Kashmir
Valley. The UN organized the ceasefire so that a referendum might be held to determine the state
of the region (whether it would remain a part of Pakistan, India, or independent). However, this
referendum has never been held due to decades of continued ceasefire violations, paramilitary
violence on both sides, and political stubbornness on the part of those negotiating (“UNMOGIP
Background”).
The presence of UN peacekeepers in Kashmir officially began with the establishment of the
UN Commission for India and Pakistan (“UNCIP”) in 1948 to act as a mediator between to the
two countries during Indo-Pakistani War; they observed the ceasefire of 1949 but were “based on
strict principles of impartiality and non-interference” (“National Defense and the Canadian
Forces”) and consisted of representatives from five countries outside of India and Pakistan.
Because of this, they were viewed as a neutral force in the conflict. However, this mission soon
expanded into the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) whose
original responsibility was to observe the ceasefire. The Karachi Agreement of July 1949
decided the ceasefire line would be managed by the UNMOGIP and that if local citizens on the
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border had any issues, they could bring it up with the UN military officials (mainly consisting of
Canadian forces) who were to remain impartial and not involve themselves in any physical
disputes. The UNCIP was officially disbanded in 1951, which resulted in the expansion of
responsibilities for the UNMOGIP. Renewed violence occurred along the border in 1971 due to
clashes from the East Pakistani (modern-day Bangladesh) independence movement against both
Pakistani and Indian forces, putting an end to the mandated ceasefire. The Simla Agreement of
1972 was meant to create another ceasefire, to uphold the Line of Control, and to not get
involved in each other’s internal affairs. Since this agreement, both India and Pakistan have
continued the conflict, through multiple ceasefire violations.
The conflict had steadily worsened: in the early 1990s, a number of paramilitary groups
emerged in the Kashmir Valley with many supporting a merge with Pakistan, which reflected the
Muslim majority region. After years of fighting on the border, the two countries celebrated the
50th anniversary of their respective independences with the meeting of Indian and Pakistani
foreign ministers in 1997. While not much was accomplished on a larger scale, the two nations
agreed to revisit the peace talks. Throughout the 90s, nuclear tensions between the two countries
heightened as well; both Pakistan and India had successfully constructed and tested nuclear
weapons. Due to a rise in conflict between the two regions coming to a head in Kashmir and
Jammu, the international community ostracized the nations until they pledged to end the arms
race. In February of 1999, the Lahore Declaration was signed by both nations, agreeing to direct
efforts towards the fighting, the nuclear weapons, and the border in Kashmir and Jammu.
However, this did not last long as India attacked Pakistani forces in the mountains in IndianKashmir with air strikes in May of 1999. Any peace that was achieved with the Lahore
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Declaration was lost within the next few years as fighting continued at the border and in the
regions, with most of it occurring in Kashmir (“CNN Kashmir”).

Kashmir in the 21st Century
After a tumultuous 20th century in the region of Kashmir, the situation seemed to be
improving with the acceptance, on the part of India, of a Pakistani offer of a ceasefire along the
border of Kashmir in 2003. This was the first successful agreement of a ceasefire in 14 years.
The agreement led to a number of meetings at the highest level between government officials of
India and Pakistan, including between the Prime Minister and the President respectively in 2004,
2006, 2007, and 2008.
However, the peace faced in the early 21st century soon became mixed with renewed
violence and uncertainty along the Line of Control and within the region of Kashmir. This is
demonstrated when, in the summer of 2010, clashes in Kashmir caused the deaths of more than
100 people. The death toll and violence was the worst the region had seen in years. Peace
meetings and visits continued during this time but the escalation of violence and violations of the
ceasefire represented a region still in great conflict. Within the past two years, there have been
numerous deaths (Indian, Pakistani, and Kashmiri), violations of the ceasefire, and violent
protests (“Council on Foreign Relations”). Specifically, the ceasefire that was agreed upon by
both sides has been violated along the Line of Control many times throughout the 21st century;
there were over 400 ceasefire violations along the border within the first two months of 2018
(“Times of India”).
The fact of the matter is that in present day Kashmir, the ceasefire is less of a hardened
rule and more of a suggestion. A 30-day ceasefire was enacted during the month of Ramadan in
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May/June of 2018, but at the end of the observance period, the Indian military resumed its
fighting with rebels in their section of Jammu and Kashmir. During the month period, the
militant groups did not stop their violent actions, state chief spokesperson for Bharatiya Janta
Party (BJP) in India, Sunil Sethi, stated to Al Jazeera, “The ceasefire became meaningless. It
became difficult for the government to continue. We could not continue at the cost of so much
blood on the streets” (Fareed). The UN conducted research and released a report that details the
numerous human rights violations that have occurred in Kashmir at the hands of both the Indian
and Pakistani militaries and paramilitaries along the Line of Control. The violations range from
unlawful killings to the Armed Forces Special Power Act of 1990 (AFSPA, which states that it is
unlawful to prosecute members of the military unless given prior allowance by the Indian
government), to sexual violence such as soldiers responsible for gang rape to broad antiterrorism laws that restrict dissidence. In the report, the UN urges India to repeal the AFSPA so
that unlawful crimes such as killings and sexual violence can be properly prosecuted without
bias. In Pakistan, the UN calls for an end to the abuse of the anti-terrorism legislation that is used
against those who engage in peaceful protest, requesting the release of all those who have been
jailed for such crimes.
This report, released in June, along with the Ramadan ceasefire, would make it seem like
the UN has made great strides in the past couple of months in Kashmir. However, the violence
across the Line of Control did not end with the ceasefire; it continued after the 30 days of
Ramadan ended. Additionally, the human rights report created by the UN has no real legislative
importance in the crimes that have occurred in Kashmir. The Indian Government even went so
far as to call the report, “fallacious, tendentious, and motivated” (“Human Rights Watch”). This
disregard for the attempts at a successful ceasefire and for justice in a conflict zone are what fuel
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the questions about the effectiveness of UN peacekeepers along the Line of Control. Out of the
seven decades that they have been present in that region, daily violence along the border exists,
destroying the lives of those who call the region home. The peacekeepers’ ability to enact
concrete change can be affected by the level at which they can get involved (they are restricted
from acting partially or by becoming directly involved in the conflict). While this is
understandable, the UN defines peacekeeping as an “early transition from conflict to peace;” The
time for an early transition has long passed – the peacekeepers that are a part of the UNMOGIP
have been engaged in the conflict with little ability to act in the conflict. Since the 2003
ceasefire, the opinions surrounding the ultimate identity of Kashmir and Jammu are fierce and
have not budged since the problem first arose in the 20th century (“CNN Kashmir”).

Case Study: Northern Ireland
Historical Overview of the Conflict

Map of Northern Ireland
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The main conflict in Northern Ireland is between nationalists, who believe the region should
be a part of the (mostly Catholic) Republic of Ireland again, and the unionists, who believe that
the region should remain a part of the (mostly Protestant) United Kingdom. The conflict between
Catholics and Protestants is not new to the island of Ireland itself, but the jurisdiction of
Northern Ireland was decided with the partitioning of Ireland in 1921. Southern Ireland and the
northern counties of Monaghan, Cavan and Donegal became the Irish Free State and later the
Republic of Ireland. Despite the Partition, the unionist majority in the remaining six counties in
Northern Ireland chose to remain in the United Kingdom, even though a growing minority of
nationalists wanted to be reunited with the rest of Ireland (“BBC”).
In Northern Ireland, religious tensions had existed between the two groups for centuries
before, but the period called the “Troubles,” from 1968 to 1998, was the 30-year period of
heightened protests, violence, and terrorism on the part of paramilitary groups. The event that is
said to have marked the beginning of the Troubles was a civil rights march in
Londonderry/Derry on October 5, 1968. While other marches had occurred before, this was
different due to the suppression of Irish Catholics by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), who
charged the crowd with batons and left many protestors injured, including some members of
Parliament. This event along with rioting that occurred in Londonderry/Derry the days following
attracted international attention to the conflict.
The Troubles continued with an over four-year internment period led by the British Army
and Northern Irish police, where 1,981 people were detained (1,874 Catholic/Republican and
107 Protestant/Loyalist). It began with Operation Demetrius on August 9th, 1971, when 342
people were taken in raids across Northern Ireland and placed in camps. While this was meant to
curb the violence, it only heightened it, causing more protests and riots. One of the most famous
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protests in response to the internment was nicknamed, “Bloody Sunday”. This march, organized
by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA), was intended to be a peaceful
demonstration. Nationalist youth and British soldiers engaged in physical conflict at one point
during the march and the Army’s response led by opening fire on the crowd, shooting 28
civilians and killing 14 people (Melaugh).
The Nationalists were not without fault, as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
functioned as a paramilitary group that wreaked havoc on Northern Ireland and England with a
number of random bombings throughout the 30-year period. The most infamous of the bombings
took place on July 21, 1972. Nicknamed “Bloody Friday,” the PIRA planted 22 bombs across
Belfast and detonated each one within an hour and a half period, killing 9 and injuring 130
people (“BBC”). Other bombings that occurred throughout England brought the issue of
Northern Ireland to the forefront of English press and put pressure on English politicians.
In the case of the conflict in Northern Ireland, British troops served as peacekeepers during
and after the Troubles through Operation Banner, from 1969 to 2007. Leaders of Northern
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland called on the UN to send peacekeepers at the beginning of
the Troubles, but the United Kingdom denied this request and sent British troops instead. While
they were initially welcomed by the populace (both Protestant and Catholic), it soon became
apparent that they supported the loyalist viewpoint and some were even working with the
unionist paramilitary groups. Additionally, the perceived bias on behalf of the Irish Catholics of
the unionist allegiance on the part of British troops and the RUC aided in the decades of distrust
of their peacekeepers. The amount of over-policing and corruption that occurred in Northern
Ireland during the Troubles greatly exacerbated the problem at hand, as the peacekeepers that
were sent as “non-partisan members” supported a side (Melaugh).
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The violence, militant activity, and corruption continued until the Good Friday Agreement in
1998, which was drafted by the British and Irish governments as well as the majority of political
parties in Northern Ireland. It created a “nationalist and unionist power-sharing government in
Northern Ireland” (NIA). Furthermore, it calls for a new government that is supportive and
recognizes both the unionist side and the nationalist side, and pleases both by remaining in the
United Kingdom but allowing for a loose border between Northern Ireland and Ireland and for
Northern Irish citizens to obtain dual British and Irish citizenship. Additionally, it acknowledges
the need to recognize the diversity of the region and to uplift the mixture of cultures that exist in
Northern Ireland. This marked the end of the 30-year conflict known as the Troubles, although
Operation Banner did not end until 2007 (“The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement”).

Northern Ireland in the 21st Century
The end of Operation Banner in 2007 marked the end of the peacemaking phase in
Northern Ireland. It was deemed a post-conflict region as the Good Friday Agreement seemed to
mainly have stopped paramilitary activity on both sides and violent uprisings between both
groups. Groups like the PIRA, Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defense Association
(UDA) have stepped down or ceased to function. However, to say that paramilitary groups are
not a part of Northern Irish “post-conflict” life would be a lie. Four new dissident republican
(nationalist) paramilitary groups have emerged since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement:
the new IRA, the Continuity IRA (CIRA), Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH), and Arm na Poblacht
(ANP). Three new loyalist (unionist) groups emerged from the paramilitaries of the Troubles as
well: The Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), the Red Hand Defenders, and the Orange Volunteers.
The paramilitary groups on both sides continue to carry out murders of those on the other side as
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well as members of their own groups that have “betrayed” or “abandoned” them. A total of 158
people have died in relation to “security-related killings,” as the Police Service of Northern
Ireland (PSNI) calls them, from 1998 to 2017 (Nolan). Some theorize that because they are not
killing multiple people at a time, it is considered an “acceptable level of violence” (Nolan). Also,
they are responsible for shootings, beatings, and intimidation in their communities, continually
trying to undermine the power of the PSNI and often hold a position of power in their
communities due to fear tactics.
Another aspect of “post-conflict” life in Northern Ireland is the renewal of tensions
during “marching season,” which takes place during the months of April to September but
heightens around July with parades that commemorate the Battle of the Boyne, which was the
victory of Protestant King William of Orange over Catholic King James II. Around July 12th,
Protestant groups march in celebration, yet when they go near Catholic neighborhoods, tensions
arise and violence can erupt. To separate Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods from violence
that stems during this time and around the year, peace walls were built during the Troubles
between the rivalling neighborhoods that remain in cities like Belfast and Londonderry/Derry
today, closing at either 9 p.m. or 10 p.m. every night.
Recently, the question of Northern Ireland in relation to Brexit has renewed old tensions
as well. With the announcement of the United Kingdom’s plan to leave the European Union
(EU), one of the first issues with the results of the referendum was the border between Northern
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, which will remain in the EU. The Good Friday Agreement
guaranteed that there would be a soft border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland and that Northern Irish citizens could have dual British and Irish citizenship, appealing to
the nationalists. It also allowed for a referendum to decide whether to rejoin with the Republic of
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Ireland, which is one of the proposed the solutions if the United Kingdom actually leaves the EU,
as the majority of Northern Irish citizens voted to remain the EU in 2016. The main issue is that
if the United Kingdom wants to protect its borders so that it can control who enters the country,
the nature of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland comes into
question. If a hard border is created between the two regions, it will heavily affect trade and the
citizenship promised to nationalists in the Good Friday Agreement. Prime Minister Theresa May
has stated that she does not want to create a hard border between the two, yet she also said that
she intends to enforce the borders of the United Kingdom, including Northern Ireland. The
border conflict has created a major impediment to the negotiated Brexit process.

Analysis
The thesis states that the presence of peacekeepers and peacekeeping achievements are
not representative of the state of the conflict. Furthermore, it claims that because they do not
solve the social and structural causes of the conflict, they cannot be considered the last step
towards achieving post-conflict status. Through the literature review, it is evident that this
statement is not fully supported nor fully denied by scholars. However, the description of the
case studies demonstrates the longevity of the conflicts and how the conflicts have continued
well into the 20th century and how, if not dealt with properly, the conflict can emerge again.
Therefore, when analyzing the effectiveness of peacekeepers (whether they hurt or help the
situations), the case studies of Kashmir and Northern Ireland prove that due to the failure to
follow peacekeeping efforts with peacebuilding efforts, the conflict continues even with the
absence of some or all violence because negative peace is only short-term.
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The conflicts viewed in the case studies are not the same; one is a conflict of land and
religion that resulted from decolonization, and another is a conflict of national identity that is
based in religious prejudice. What is similar about them is that they are relatively recent in the
sense that, although they derive from conflicts that have existed for centuries, revolutionary
events of the 20th century exacerbated the violence. Both faced guerilla warfare and religious
bias used as an oppressive tool. Their statuses in today’s world are what make the way they were
handled interesting. In the case of Kashmir, the UN’s peacekeepers have been serving as border
control since 1948 and as mentioned in the previous section, it would be eager to say that they
have achieved negative peace. In the case of Northern Ireland, the British troops served as
peacekeepers since 1968 and, although they were accused of partisanship and brutality against
civilians, their operation ended in 2007 and was considered successful. It is interesting that the
region that had state peacekeepers was further along in the peace process and not the region that
had international peacekeepers.
There are a multitude of variables that could have caused such a disparity between the
achievements of the two missions. One such variable is the difference in nature of the
peacekeepers; the UN mission was viewed as neutral while the British troops were viewed as
biased. Nonetheless, whether they are state or international is not determinant of the
ineffectiveness. The lack of peacebuilding initiatives is what allows the conflicts to continue.
Therefore, the argument does not hinge on the distrust of peacekeeping forces.
One of the major connections between the Kashmiri conflict and the Northern Irish
conflict is the longevity of the peacekeeping mission in Kashmir (over 70 years) and Operation
Banner in Northern Ireland (39 years). Without a set, finite period of time for the missions, the
longevity allows for the normalization of their presence and turns the missions away from the
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purpose of political peace (getting people to sign a peace agreement) and turns the mission
towards gaining a military peace (end of violence). In the case of Kashmir, their presence has
nearly become an obstacle for furthering the peace process. They act as border control, but there
are still ceasefire violations daily. Along with the UN study documenting the human rights
violations on the part of both Pakistan and Indian forces while peacekeeping forces were on the
ground, their effectiveness towards securing a political peace in the region is slight. While it can
be argued that political peace was achieved in Northern Ireland with the Good Friday
Agreement, the possibility of Brexit has demonstrated how fragile that peace is. Amanda Sloat
recently wrote an article detailing this fragility claiming, “…the Good Friday Agreement
provided an imperfect but workable solution for a war-weary population. Brexit has re-opened
old wounds”. A reason why Northern Ireland was able to escape the stagnation of the conflict in
Kashmir was because the violence occurred outside of the contained area (in England and
Ireland), bringing outside actors into the conflict. However, violence in Kashmir has mainly
occurred along the Line of Control.
What is essential to the thesis is the connection between Galtung’s two theories: the
theory of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding and the theory of negative peace and
positive peace. To reiterate, peacekeeping and peacemaking are the steps taken leading up to,
during, and immediately after the peace negotiation process takes place in a conflict situation. Its
main goal is to quell the violence so that it does not restart and keeping tensions low so that a
peace agreement can be achieved and the society or community can return to some sort of
normalcy. This may take a long period of time due to the tendency of rival sides of a conflict to
draw out the peace process, but the intention of these steps is thought of as more short-term.
Peacebuilding is the final, more drawn out step that aims to attack the root of the conflict and

Brennan 30
therefore requires a change to the structural and social aspects of the society that have upheld the
causes of the conflict.
The connection between this theory and negative and positive peace is what causes the
mislabeling of a region as ‘post-conflict’. The notion of achieving peace, in any form, allows for
the title ‘post-conflict’. However, the actions taken during the peacekeeping and peacemaking
steps are only likely to achieve negative peace, which is the absence of violence from a conflict
(typically a previously violent conflict), as they typically deal with the negotiation period. For
the cases of Northern Ireland and Kashmir, the end of violence was greatly welcomed (or is
greatly sought after in the case of Kashmir) and was not an easy feat. The creation of negative
peace within a conflict is a necessary step towards a permanent peace, as are the steps of
peacekeeping and peacemaking. However, this becomes an issue when those overseeing the
peace process take the negative peace as a sign that the conflict has been resolved and that its
traces in the community are no longer present. Now, those overseeing the conflicts in Northern
Ireland and Kashmir understand that just because the violence and ceased or decreased, it does
not mean that the deeply-rooted conflicts in those regions are gone forever. Nevertheless, the
state of negative peace is simply accepted as is; the conflicts are not thought of in terms of the
need to reconcile the two communities but rather as the need for these communities to coexist
with each other. This is in accordance with the idea that the absence of violence is peace.
However, Galtung’s notion of positive peace changes that narrative as it claims that only
positive peace constitutes the complete resolution of the conflict. One might ask themselves, how
does one achieve a complete resolution? This can be done through peacebuilding as it addresses
the issues that are systematically and socially ingrained in a community. Peacebuilding is not a
common step in the process of restoring a society after conflict because it requires a lot to
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achieve. It requires money, as there need to be people who dedicate all of their time to
facilitating reconciliation between the conflicting groups and advocating for the breaking down
of the barriers. Money is also necessary for events and organizations that are aimed at changing
the way the society functions at the moment. It requires time, as these conflicts are not going to
dissipate after one day. They have become a part of the community and for prejudices or biases
to be deconstructed, the entire way the people think and behave in the community has to be
modified, which includes their daily routines, their social groups, their private conflict in relation
to the larger conflict. It also requires the willingness to participate on both sides. They do not
have to be eager or even the first to initiate the process of reconciliation; they simply need to be
open towards the idea of meeting or talking to the other group. However, all three of these
requirements are hard to come by in the peacekeeping/peacemaking steps. Therefore, negative
peace is accepted even though the conflict continues to exist within the structures and social
patterns of the society.
In Northern Ireland, the Good Friday Agreement, on paper, is a shining example of how
to incorporate the social and structural aspects of the conflict into the peace negotiation process.
What is interesting is that, despite the treaty being so progressive in the sense that it shows a real
promise for peacebuilding, the region, especially city centers like Belfast or Londonderry/Derry,
still grapple with the conflict. As mentioned before, peacebuilding is a long process, but the way
in which the communities function is very much in a way that avoids the bringing together of
both sides. A number of cultural and structural examples are the annual “marching season,” the
peace walls that separate the Protestant and Catholic neighborhoods and close every night, and
the paramilitary groups that still exist on both sides, who run entire neighborhoods and
communities through fear and intimidation. The recent Brexit developments have only
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exacerbated the issue in Northern Ireland, exposing many tensions that existed below the surface
of the society. Therefore, the conflict cannot be viewed as resolved.
This begs the question of the role of the peacekeepers in this post-violent conflict society;
the Operation Banner (or the deployment of British troops to Northern Ireland) ended in 2007,
hinting that they had entered the post-conflict society and no longer needed monitoring. I argue
that while their presence in Northern Ireland may have heightened the tensions even after the
signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the conflict continues even after the termination of
Operation Banner because it was not followed with peacebuilding efforts. This is not to say that
grassroots movements cannot have success in the reconciliation of the two groups, as they can
achieve incredible ground in the peace process. But because the peacekeeper’s responsibilities
are commonly confused with that of peacebuilding, the end of Operation Banner can be viewed
as the British government declaring Northern Ireland in a post-conflict state.
In the case of Kashmir, the peace agreements that were drafted by both the Pakistani and
Indian governments have continually been broken. Because the UN peacekeepers are along the
Line of Control, it is clear that their presence there has not stopped the blatant violations and the
movement towards positive peace is not within the immediate future of Kashmir. However,
because there is ongoing violence, even if it is localized to the Line of Control, I contend that the
region has yet to reach a negative peace. UN peacekeepers have been present in Kashmir since
1948 and a peace agreement has not achieved long-term success yet. According to Galtung, the
role of peacekeepers is to enter a conflict towards the end – when it is nearing peace
negotiations. Even though the conflict in Kashmir has neared that point and even participated in
the negotiations before, the failure of these agreements puts into question the roles of the
peacekeepers that are currently there.
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The continued presence of peacekeepers in Kashmir has not resulted in a successful
movement towards positive peace let alone a period of negative peace. There are many forces
that are working against the efforts of the peacekeepers, such as paramilitary groups, military
groups and the continued structural and social conflict. If the purpose of the peacekeepers has not
been achieved in 70 years, it is fair to claim that their approach of acting as border patrol is not
working properly, especially since the majority of the violence and ceasefire violations are
occurring at the border.
The absence of peacekeepers in Northern Ireland has not benefited the movement
towards positive peace, and the presence of peacekeepers in Kashmir has not helped the
movement towards a positive or negative peace. Therefore, the general ineffectiveness of
peacekeepers in their respective regions is reason for why their presence should not be indicative
of the state of that particular conflict.
The results expected from the initial thesis were different than originally thought at the
beginning of the research. One of the most important realizations was the near constant violence
that continues to occur in Kashmir even though it is rarely discussed within the international
community. It is not the most pressing issue, but there are frequent violations of a ceasefire that
was and is supported by the UN. This negated the idea that both Kashmir and Northern Ireland
are in a state of negative peace because the patterns of behavior in Kashmir do not align with a
state that has put an end to violence and has allowed for the community to return to some
normalcy.
Another important discovery was the details of the Good Friday Agreement. Upon
reading it, the document does have sections where it advocates for certain changes to the society
that are similar to, if not exactly the steps of peacebuilding. However, the result was not a
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success as even though both cultures were represented as harmonious and naturally together in
the agreement, the prejudices held by the citizens were not changed. This allowed the conflict to
continue within the people, which is what can lead to rebirths of the conflict.

Conclusion
The presence or absence of peacekeepers, whether they are international or state in
nature, has limited effect on the ability to achieve a resolved state, as seen through a comparative
study of the conflicts in Kashmir and Northern Ireland. Because of this, they need to be followed
by peacebuilding efforts addressing the root of the conflict and should not be viewed as both
peacekeepers and peacebuilders.
The purpose of a peacekeeper, whether working under the United Nations or not, is
supposed to maintain peace in conflict-ridden areas while negotiations are put into place.
Additionally, peacekeepers typically stay even after a negotiation has been settled to ensure that
the conflict does not arise again and that the government and society remain stable for a
mandated period of time. Many parties to the conflict, however, view peacekeepers as the final
step towards a recovered society, which is in fact the role of peacebuilders, which are rarely
utilized in most modern-day peace processes. Peacebuilders address the root of the conflict,
which takes a much longer time period but also produces a positive peace in place of the
negative peace created by peacekeepers. Scholars who also study the peacekeeping process do
not reach a consensus on the benefits and effectiveness of peacekeeping, some claiming that they
fulfill the duty that they are called to and maintain a level of peace while those at the head of the
conflict figure out how to proceed, others also claim that a third-party involvement can in fact
prolong the conflict. Therefore, the thesis statement would be controversial within the scholarly
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group as some would argue against it while others would support it. The case studies illustrate
how the situations in Kashmir and Northern Ireland may be different, but neither are close to
achieving the positive peace, which should be the only way to garner the title, ‘post conflict’.
Without peacebuilding, there is only peacekeeping, which fails to produce results of
positive peace. The only way to change this narrative is to implement methods of peacebuilding
within the peace negotiations process and follow through, highlighting it as the most important
aspect. Additionally, the way that peacekeeping is viewed must change in order for the
acceptance of peacebuilding as a separate step that is a part of the conflict.
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